ShowTime

CPU Timing Attacks with the Human Eye

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
Time to Start


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




























Side-channel attacks exploit minuscule timing differences




1-100 ns



Side-channel attacks exploit minuscule timing differences







Side-channel attacks exploit minuscule timing differences






































































 $> 100~\mu s$

























Attacker Model

Basic capabilities

Cross-core
No hugepages
No fixed CPU frequency























not in cache

















in cache





















multi-shot amplifier









multi-shot amplifier





















not in cache







5100 μs

multi-shot amplifier
































































100 μs




200 μs


Sets and Eviction




Sets and Eviction





tag index offset





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























































X










B





BABCBDBA…



























BABCBDBA…

all L1 hits

















all L1 hits













all L1 hits

BABCBDBA…

many L1 misses















BABCBDBA...

all L1 hits

many L1 misses

1. **from** 1.3x to 2x



















BABCBDBA··· BABCBDBA···

all I 1 hits

many L1 misses

- from 1.3x to 2x
- 2. **T** from 500us to 5ms











BABCBDBA...


BABCBDBA…

all L1 hits


many L1 misses

- 1. **from** 1.3x to 2x
- 2. **The image of the image of t**
- 3. 💂 amplify more side channels


































- 1. 🚺 10×
- 2. 📘 ? ms

Live Demo

Can the audience perform a cache attack with their eyes?

Fifteen humans (100 samples each)



Fifteen humans (100 samples each)



Average

98.4%

Fifteen humans (100 samples each)



Average 98.4% Median 99%

Max 100%

Time to Order







res = fn()

load(res)
load(x)

Time to Order

```
dep = prepare()
```

race-end(dep1, dep2)

Time to Order



```
d = evict(A)
```

```
// first leg  // second leg
d1 = secret-delay(d)  d2 = fixed-delay(d)
d1 = load(A ^ d1)  d2 = prefetchNTA(A ^ d2)
```

load(B ^ d1 ^ d2)

Teasers

Cross-core port contention




CPU frequency




Architectural reordering



Eviction set construction



Eviction Set Construction



LLC Eviction Sets





 $100 \mu s$



📢 L1 PLRU 🌲



Time To Order

LLC Eviction Sets





100 µs



📢 L1 PLRU 🜲



Time To Order










 $1\,\mathrm{ms}$

 $1\,\mu s$


Timer Granularity

$$1 \, \mathrm{ms}$$
 $1 \, \mathrm{ms}$ $10 \, \mathrm{\mu s}$


Timer Granularity




Timer Granularity





Timer Granularity




Timer Granularity









Takeaways

Restricting timers is not a holistic countermeasure against timing attacks

Takeaways

Restricting timers is not a holistic countermeasure against timing attacks



Takeaways

Restricting timers is not a holistic countermeasure against timing attacks



Side channels can be converted



ShowTime

CPU Timing Attacks with the Human Eye

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