


Server-Side Browsers: Exploring the Web's Hidden Attack Surface

Marius Musch
TU Braunschweig

Joint work with Robin Kirchner, Max Boll, and Martin Johns

The Scenario


Request for Preview



1



Request for Preview




1



2

```
<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><link rel="stylesheet"
href="https://cdn.org/base.css"></head><body></img><h1>Kittenpics.org</h1><script
src="https://cdn.org/76dsdasd.js"></script><div class="wh-fms-3-daf">
</div><p>Kittenpics.org is your resource...</p>[...]
```

Request for Preview



1



3




Automated Browsers



```
const { chromium } = require('playwright');  
(async () => {  
  const browser = await chromium.launch();  
  const page = await browser.newPage();  
  await page.goto('http://example.com');  
  // Do something with the page  
  await browser.close();  
})();
```


Browser for Preview



1



Browser for Preview




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
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



3




The Problem


SSRF Attacks



SSRF Attacks



SSRF Attacks



1

Response to @Twtrr



Please fetch me a preview 🤖

<https://192.168.1.23/>



Tweet

3



kittenpics.org
@imrobink

Please fetch me a preview 🤖



192.168.1.23

Welcome to our secret internal company wiki!

7:26 PM · May 16, 2022

673 Reply Share

Read 77 replies

SSR vs SSB

Server-Side Request (**SSR**)

- **Use case:** Extract content from text document (HTML, JSON, ...)
- **Tools:** `wget`, `curl`, HTTP libraries ...

Server-Side Browser (**SSB**)

- **Use case:** Create screenshot of rendered website
- **Tools:** PhantomJS, Headless Chrome, Puppeteer, Playwright ...

Parse and execute the response
(on top of all problems of SSRs)



Flash poll

Who here regularly updates **system-wide** packages on their devices and servers?
apt, pacman, brew, etc.

Flash poll

Who here regularly updates **project-specific** packages on their devices and servers?

npm, pip, maven, etc.

Outdated Browsers

Browsers often have vulnerabilities with high/critical severity

- Usually disclosed 90 days after fix
- Some with public PoC exploits

No problem, as browsers update automatically ... ?

On consumer devices **yes** - but SSBs do **not**!

- *“Each version of Puppeteer bundles a specific version of Chromium – the only version it is guaranteed to work with.” [1]*

[1] <https://pptr.dev/faq#q-why-doesnt-puppeteer-vxxx-work-with-chromium-vyyy>

The Issue in a Nutshell


```
marius@bahamut:~/ruhrsec sudo apt-get upgrade
Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree
Reading state information... Done
Calculating upgrade... Done
0 upgraded, 0 newly installed, 0 to remove and 0 not upgraded.
marius@bahamut:~/ruhrsec npm audit
found 0 vulnerabilities
marius@bahamut:~/ruhrsec node ssb.js
Running HeadlessChrome/86.0.4240.0
marius@bahamut:~/ruhrsec cat package.json
{
  "dependencies": {
    "puppeteer": "5.3"
  }
}
```




CVE: 2020-16014
CVSS: 9.6 Critical

Regularly update both your system packages AND project dependencies!


Attack Scenario



1



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


2

```
<html><head><script>function boom() { var fuzz1 = document.getElementById("fuzz1"); fuzz2.after(fuzz1); setTimeout('location.reload(true);', 100);}function boom2() { var fuzz3 = document.getElementById("fuzz3"); var fuzz4 = document.getElementById("fuzz4"); fuzz4.appendChild(fuzz3);}</script></head><body onload=boom()><option id="fuzz3" ><iframe id="fuzz2" srcdoc="AAAAAAAAAAAA" onload="boom2()"></iframe><option id="fuzz4" ></option><portal id="fuzz1" ></portal></body></html>
```



Attack Scenario




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


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```



Fusion!!




The Large-Scale Study

Automatic Detection

- 1 How to trigger server-side requests?
- 2 How to discover the server-side browsers among them?
- 3 How to determine their actual browser version?
- 4 How many are vulnerable to public exploits?

→ Large scale study on 100,000 websites

1 Discovering SSRs



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
3 ways to entice websites to visit our unique URLs

- **Forms** – Submit with our URLs
- **Headers** – Set our URLs as **Referer** header on each request
- **Query** – Modify discovered URLs and replay with different values

```
http://example.com?from=foo.com&id=3
```

```
http://example.com?from=id9543.our-server.com&id=3
```

② Identifying SSBs



② Identifying SSBs

Our server replies with HTML + JavaScript

- JavaScript collects some client-side information and sends it
- If this happens, it is a browser

How do we know this was not a human visitor?

- Likely, if visit happens within the first 3 minutes after our URL submission

Visited 2.6M pages on 79k sites

- 168,055 incoming requests from 4850 domains
- 3,264 requests with server-side browser from 254 domains (JS execution and within 3 minutes)

3 Detecting Browser Versions

User agent string too easy to spoof

- Find behavioral differences
- Extract all JavaScript objects in `window`

```
130     var globals = ["AggregateError", "Array", "ArrayBuffer", "Atomics", "BigInt", "BigInt64Array", "BigUint64Array", "Boolean", "DataView", "Date", "Error", "EvalError", "FinalizationRegistry", "Float32Array", "Float64Array", "Function", "Int16Array", "Int32Array", "Int8Array", "JSON", "Map", "Number", "Object", "Promise", "Proxy", "RangeError", "ReferenceError", "Reflect", "RegExp", "Set", "SharedArrayBuffer", "String", "Symbol", "SyntaxError", "TypeError", "URIError", "Uint16Array", "Uint32Array", "Uint8Array", "Uint8ClampedArray", "WeakMap", "WeakRef", "WeakSet", "Infinity", "AbortController", "AbortSignal", "AnalyserNode", "Animation", "AnimationEffect", "AnimationEvent", "Attr", "AudioBuffer", "AudioBufferSourceNode", "AudioContext", "AudioDestinationNode", "AudioListener", "AudioNode", "AudioParam", "AudioParamMap", "AudioProcessingEvent", "AudioScheduledSourceNode", "AudioWorkletNode", "BackgroundFetchManager", "BackgroundFetchRecord", "BackgroundFetchRegistration", "BarProp", "BaseAudioContext", "BatteryManager", "BeforeInstallPromptEvent", "BeforeUnloadEvent", "BiquadFilterNode", "Blob", "BlobEvent", "BluetoothUUID", "BroadcastChannel", "ByteLengthQueuingStrategy", "CDATASection", "CSS", "CSSAnimation", "CSSCondi
```

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Feature of window	Feature supported since				Feature exists in sample	
	Chrome	Firefox	Opera	Safari	Sample 1	Sample 2
RTCCertificate	49	42	36	12	✓	✓
MutationObserver	26	14	15	7	✓	✓
WeakRef	84	79	-	-	✓	✓
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Chrome 84

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
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Chrome 84 Firefox >= 79

If you liked this, you might also enjoy...



Liars

About 25% lied about their user agent!

- Some cases HTTP user agent != JS user agent
- Most cases user agent != platform

navigator.platform “Linux x86_64” but user agent

- CPU iPhone OS 13_7 [...] Version/13.1.2
- Windows NT 6.1 [...] Chrome/83.0.4103.106
- iPad; CPU OS 11_4 [...] Version/11.0
- ...


3 Browser Versions

Data collection in March 2021

- At that time Chrome 88/89 was stable

Most popular browsers in our data

- 19%: Chrome 88 from Jan 2021
- 28%: Chrome 84 from July 2020
- 18%: Chrome 85 from Aug 2020
- 16%: Chrome 86 from Oct 2020
- 2%: Edge 85 from Aug 2020




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
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Browser	CVE
Chrome 84	CVE 2020-6559
Chrome 85	CVE 2020-6575
Chrome 86	CVE 2020-16015
Edge 85	CVE 2020-6574


4 Vulnerable SSBs Distribution

254 domains with SSBs



4 Vulnerable SSBs Distribution

168 / 254 domains with SSBs vulnerable to public exploits



Popular websites are here

The Takeaways

Countermeasures

First, prevent classical SSRF attacks

- Isolate the machine from your internal network
- Enforce http(s)://

On top of that, for server-side browsers:

Keep the browser diligently up-to-date

- Regular updates of all your project's dependencies
- Be aware that various tools might miss these 'bundled' vulnerabilities

Isolate the browser from the OS

- Run as non-privileged user, consider additional hardening
- Make sure that user has no access to sensitive secrets

Summary

- Unique attack surface
 - Execute untrusted code on server-side
 - Browsers contain critical bugs at high rate
 - Are not updated automatically

➡ Really dangerous combination!

Identified 168/254 vulnerable SSBs

➡ 2 out of 3 deployments vulnerable!



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Interested in job opportunities